The Atomic Bizarre: Nuclear security and
proliferation – key issues of concern
Dr David Lowry
Environmental policy
and research consultant, member Nuclear Waste Advisory Associates, and former director, European Proliferation
Information Centre (EPIC)
Nuclear security,
nuclear weapons and nuclear new build – key issues for consideration by the
NFLA
Nuclear Free Local
Authorities (NFLA) Annual Policy Seminar
Friday 6th December 2013, Committee Room 4, County Hall,
Atlantic Wharf, Cardiff, CF10 4UW 1.30am – 3.30pm
“It is my
understanding from the limited information available that Iraq ceased to
participate in the activities of the Baghdad pact nuclear training centre when
it was transferred to Tehran following the revolution in Iraq in 1959.”
HC Deb 14
December 1992 vol 216 cc23-4W
This
reveals that a British government was responsible for supplying both Iraq and
Iran with basis for their nuclear programmes. And therein lies a long-standing
problem
The
minister was Michael Heseltine; the MP, Paul Flynn
This goes
to show that Parliament has a long history in overseeing nuclear activities-
and nuclear activities, including British exports, go back a very long way
A year ago the Independent
newspaper reported:
“Britain today issued a renewed
appeal for countries to come together and combat the threat of a nuclear
terrorist attack. Foreign Office minister Alistair Burt said the number of
incidents involving the loss or theft of nuclear materials around the world was
growing and nations needed to show the "utmost vigilance…."Nuclear
terrorism is a real and global threat. A successful attack, no matter where in
the world it came, would be catastrophic…..Catastrophic for the immediate
devastation and terrible loss of life, and for the far-reaching consequences -
psychological, economic, political and environmental. Such an attack was
unthinkable just a generation ago. But it is now a possibility we need to
confront with the utmost vigilance."
Independent, 1 November 2012
Britain
urges countries to join forces in combating nuclear threat
Grounds for concern
In March 1962 a 10-year-old boy discovered
a cobalt-60 industrial radiography
source, which not in its shielded
container. The boy carried the source in a pocket for several days, then it was
placed in a kitchen cabinet in his home. Four family members died of resulting
radiation sickness: the boy died 29 April (day 38), his mother on 19 July, his
2-year-old sister on 18 August, and his grandmother on 15 October. Radiation
exposure was not identified as the cause of the deaths until July-August. The
father survived with lesser symptoms. Five other individuals also received significant overdoses of radiation.
A similar incident happened occurred on 13 September
1987, at Goiânia, in the
Brazilian state of Goiás
(Gojas), after an old radioatherapy
source was stolen from an abandoned hospital site in the city. It was
subsequently handled by many people, resulting in four deaths. About 112,000
people were examined for radioactive contamination and 249 were found to have
significant levels of radioactive material in or on their body
Back in Mexico, sometime in
November, 1983, Sotelo and Ricardo Hernandez removed a Picker C-3000
teletherapy unit from a hospital warehouse in Juarez, near Mexico’s border with
US, and loaded it onto their pickup. For
one reason or another, the source capsule was perforated and approximately
1,000 pellets of Cobalt-60
fell into the bed of the truck. They then took the teletherapy unit to a
local scrapyard and sold it for $10.
At the scrapyard, many of the cobalt
pellets that had remained in the source capsule were scattered around when the
teletherapy unit was dropped by a magnetic crane. The rest of the pellets stuck
to the magnet and became mixed with steel leaving the scrapyard. Most of the
latter went to two local foundries. One foundry melted down the steel to
produce the pedestal-style table legs used in fast food restaurants. The other
produced steel rods (re-bar) for reinforcing concrete.
The problem was discovered when a
truck carrying the reinforcing rods made a wrong turn – ironically at the Los
Alamos nuclear weapons complex in New Mexico- and set off a radiation alarm. Within three
days the two foundries had been identified as the source of the contaminated
table legs and re-bar, and the scrapyard and contaminated pick-up truck had
been located.
The issue of
radioactively-contaminated recycled metals is something I know the NFLAs has
rightly taken up.
Earlier this week, another worrying radiological incident
took place, once again in Mexico. Reuters reported:
“Thieves have made off with a truck in Mexico carrying a
dangerous radioactive source used in medical treatments, a material that could
also provide an ingredient for a so-called "dirty bomb".
The U.N. nuclear agency said it had been informed by Mexican
authorities that the truck, which was taking cobalt-60 from a hospital in the
northern city of Tijuana to a radioactive waste-storage centre, was stolen near
Mexico City on Monday.”
Truck with "dangerous"
radioactive material stolen in Mexico
Reuters, 2 December 2013
Paul Flynn was told by the energy minister in a written
Parliamentary answer in October three years ago:
“Under the Nuclear Industries
Security Regulations 2003, the civil nuclear industry is required to have in
place a range of security measures to protect nuclear sites, materials,
transports and information. The cost of these security measures and the costs
of their regulation by the Office of Civil Nuclear Security are met by the
civil nuclear industry in accordance with the Nuclear Industries Security
(Fees) Regulations 2005 and the Energy Act 2004”
The minister added:
“In addition to this, my Department
has provided some capital funding to the Civil Nuclear Police Authority (CNPA)
for the procurement of large items of equipment to enable the Civil Nuclear
Constabulary to operate effectively. The CNPA then recovers the cost of these
items from the civil nuclear industry. In 2009-10, £2.7million was provided to
the CNPA by the Department.”
(Hansard, 18
October 2010: Column 481W)
Hinkley Point C’s new security issues
In October this year, Paul wondered
about the changed security arrangements that might now exist as the French
companies, EDF Energy and Areva, plus Chinese companies China General Nuclear Corporation and
China National Nuclear Corporation plan to collaborate on the planned new nuclear
power plant at Hinkley Point C; in particular, would the top executives
of these foreign companies require to be security vetted?
“In the UK, all
employees in the civil nuclear industry and contractors must be vetted to a
level of clearance commensurate with their access to nuclear material and/or
sensitive nuclear information or technology in accordance with the Nuclear
Industries Security Regulations 2003. Agreed standards and processes are applied in
accordance with the UK's national security vetting policies and all vetting
costs are recoverable from industry.”
(Hansard, 28 October 2013: Column 368W)
Nuclear
Security under-regulation
So how is our official nuclear security regulator, the Office for Nuclear
Regulation, getting on in making more robust the security of our nuclear
facilities and nuclear materials, such as the 111,000 kilogrammes of plutonium,
stored at Sellafield?
The most striking
thing to note is that on 30 August this year, the official nuclear security and safety
regulator, the Office for Nuclear Regulation explained in an introduction to
its new Nuclear Research Needs
2013-14 report:
“In 2012, ONR undertook to
publish an integrated statement of Nuclear Research Needs (NRN) to identify the
requirements for nuclear related research across the whole of ONR’s regulatory
remit. This was partly in response to a review and report on nuclear research
and development capabilities produced in 2011 by the House of Lords Select
Committee on Science and Technology, which questioned the limited scope of the
NRI. ONR committed to reviewing the NRN and expanding it to cover our entire regulatory remit:
this is the first integrated NRN published to fulfil that commitment.”
It goes on to say:
“This NRN describes the current
ONR view on the need for research related to issues that might undermine safe
and/or secure operation of UK nuclear facilities if not properly managed.”
And further states:
“This document covers the nuclear research needs of ONR’s six
operational programmes, namely:
- Civil Nuclear Security - regulates security at civil licensed nuclear
sites, and all other locations where sensitive nuclear information is
held; and the movement by road and rail within the UK, and globally within
UK flagged vessels of nuclear and other radioactive material.”
- Radioactive Materials Transport ‐
regulates safety during the transport of radioactive material by road and
rail in Great Britain, and advises on its transport by air and sea within
the UK territorial waters.
- Civil Nuclear Reactor Programme/New Build ‐
regulates the safety of operating and defueling nuclear power stations and
licensing and permissioning of proposed new build nuclear power stations.
- Sellafield Programme ‐
regulates the safety of Sellafield and Windscale nuclear licensed sites in
Cumbria.
- Decommissioning, Fuel and Waste
Programme ‐ regulates safety on a variety of
nuclear fuel sites, including fuel cycle, nuclear research, waste
management and decommissioning sites.
- Defence Programme ‐
regulates safety at defence sector nuclear sites, including submarine and
atomic weapons facilities, working closely with the Defence Nuclear Safety
Regulator (DNSR).
All of which is encouraging, until you read
on page 2 of the full 165 page document:
“…
not all
of the above technical areas have detailed research project requirements,
therefore: Nuclear Fuel Research, Civil
Nuclear Security and the Environment Agencies have not included any research projects within this detailed
research needs document.” (My emphasis)
When I read this, I had a double take. It
could not really assert that, could it? But actually, it does.
With a prospective new -build power reactor
programme, a possible export of
plutonium in MOX fuel, a possible plutonium burner-reactor and a certain
decommissioning programme involving huge
quantities of radioactively contaminated
materials being transported nationwide for many years by road, rail - and
probably ships too - from protected licensed nuclear sites, in a climate of
unresolved security concerns and terrorists threats, it is incomprehensible that the UK’s national nuclear security regulator
would have no need to do any research on
security issues.
If nothing else, the complexities of how
vetting of the huge number of people who will be crossing the thresholds of
licensed nuclear installations during transport missions, and others who have
access to the huge increase in technical documentation, will be carried out.
How will the vetters be trained, and by whom?
Nuclear’s
insecurity has been the “elephant in the room” for the nuclear industry from
the start of commercialisation of the technology in the early 1950s. Today
ministers routinely drop into speeches that safety and security are their
number one priority when they sanction any nuclear go-ahead decision.
They will almost
certainly genuflect towards Fukushima when addressing safety, but its security
failure equivalent, The terrorist attacks on New York City and Washington DC in
on 11 September 2001, is never similarly name checked.
Post 9/11 2001, at a minimum, it is difficult
to argue that there is any country with major nuclear facilities where an
attack by a small group of well-armed, well-trained terrorists, using at least
a lorry/truck bomb and having the assistance of one insider, is not a plausible
threat against which security systems should be prepared to defend. National
standards and regulations should include regular, realistic, independent
testing of the performance of security systems in defeating intelligent,
well-trained insider and outsider efforts to overcome them.
I will close with a barely
believable tale of the Atomic Bazaar
Among the reasons the Geneva talks
on Iran's nuclear programme had to be reconvened last month was that France
objected to the deal being closed off earlier.
The French objections were over Tehran's contested plutonium production plant at Arak, but whatever doubts they might have over Arak, they seem to be sanguine about Iran's involvement in uranium enrichment.
Indeed, they are in industrial partnership with the Iranians in this technology and have been for four decades since the agreement was initiated by the Shah in 1975.
Oddly, this deal never gets reported in the context of the Iran nuclear negotiations. Is there any good reason why not?
The origins of the deal illustrate the dangers of international nuclear collaboration.
A joint-stock uranium enrichment Eurodif (European gaseous diffusion uranium enrichment) consortium was formed in 1973, with France, Belgium, Spain and Sweden the original shareholders.In 1975 Sweden's 10 per cent share in Eurodif was sold to Iran.
The French government subsidiary company Cogema (now Areva) and the then Iranian government established the spin-out Sofidif (Société Franco-Iranienne pour l'enrichissement de l'uranium par diffusion gazeuse) with 60 per cent and 40 per cent shares, respectively.
In turn, Sofidif acquired a 25 per cent share in Eurodif, which gave Iran its 10 per cent share of Eurodif.
The former Shah of Iran, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, lent $1 billion (and another $180 million in 1977) for the construction of the Eurodif factory to have the right to buy 10 per cent of the site's production.
Although Iran's active involvement in Eurodif was halted following the 1979 Iranian revolution, Iran has retained its active involvement in Sofidif, headquartered in Rue La Fayette in Paris, to the present day.
Its current annual report is audited by KPMG. Dr Ali Daee of the Atomic Energy Organisation of Iran was appointed Iran's new permanent representative to Sofidif as recently as September 25 last year.
Iran's stake in Eurodif was exposed in a report written by Paris-based German nuclear expert Mycle Schneider for the Greens and the European Free Alliance in the European Parliament.
Four years ago, on 1st October 2009, an earlier preliminary atomic agreement with Iran was reached involving the UN nuclear watchdog body, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), under which it was agreed to transfer three quarters of Iran's low-enriched uranium abroad.
In return, the West agreed to supply Iran with fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor, which came online in 1967 and which produces medical isotopes for tests for around one million patients in Iran. But when Argentina, which had previously supplied the fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor, indicated it was unwilling to do so again, it prompted Iran to ask the IAEA for help.
It turned out that France was to play a critical role in resolving the impasse over enriched uranium fuel for the reactor.
Although in principle Iran's Natanz uranium enrichment plant - officially declared to the IAEA in February 2003 - could have enriched the low-enriched uranium to the level needed for the reactor to operate, the main "uranium yellowcake" feedstock for enrichment, the uranium conversion facility in Esfahan, had been contaminated.
France had both the know-how and willingness to help clean up the contaminated fuel.
Fast forward to November 2013. France, as a nuclear technology supplier to Iran, ganging up on its customer client with the other self-appointed five permanent members of the UN security council plus Germany, is guilty of breathtaking hypocrisy. It would be funny if it wasn't so serious.
The French links with Iran's nuclear
project
Morning Star 29 November 2013
Curious as to why the
extraordinary continued role of Sofidif had barely made a mark in the political
debate over Iran’s atomic ambitions, Paul posed a question earlier this week to
the Foreign Office, asking what discussions he had had with the
Iranian and French delegation
during the most recent P5+1 meeting with Iran in Geneva about the joint
Iranian-French involvement in the uranium enrichment consortium Sofidif.
“Neither Sofidif
nor Eurodif were discussed with either the French or Iranian delegations at the
recent nuclear negotiations in Geneva. Discussions focussed solely on securing
a first stage agreement between the E3+3 and Iran which addresses our most
important concerns about the Iranian nuclear programme.)
(Hansard, 2 December 2013: Column 569W)
How convenient!
Atomic salesman Cameron opens Pandora’s
Box
In classical
Greek mythology, Pandora was the first woman on Earth. Zeus ordered Hephaestus,
the god of craftsmanship, to create her, so he did—using water and earth When Prometheus - mytholigically a Titan and
trickster- stole fire from heaven, Zeus
took vengeance by presenting Pandora to Epimetheus, Prometheus' brother. With
her, Pandora was given a beautiful jar – with instructions not to open it under
any circumstance. Impelled by her curiosity (given to her by the gods), Pandora
opened it, and all evil contained therein escaped and spread over the earth.
She hastened to close the container, but the whole contents had escaped….
It is clear
from David Cameron’s trade promotion mission to China earlier this week, that
he is hawking British nuclear expertise in exchange for inward investment from
China’s State Investment bank.
The BBC reported on Wednesday:
“David Cameron has promised to
create a "partnership for growth and reform" as he visits China on a
trade mission with more than 100 UK business leaders. The PM, who met Chinese
Premier Li Keqiang on Monday, also pledged to put his "full political
weight" behind a proposed EU-China trade agreement
On
Monday, Premier Li Keqiang said the pair had agreed in their talks to
"push for breakthroughs.. on nuclear power…”
This
could indeed open Pandora’s Box.
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